The Reality of the Person (Pudgala) in the Buddhist School of Pudgalavāda
Article Type:
Research
Writers:
✍️ Hosein Saberi Varzaneh
/ Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy of Religion, Religions, and Mysticism, University of Qom, Qom, Iran / h_saberi_v@ut.ac.ir
/ Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy of Religion, Religions, and Mysticism, University of Qom, Qom, Iran / h_saberi_v@ut.ac.irAbstract:
One of the Buddha’s doctrines is the doctrine of no-substantial-self (anātman); however, this doctrine has raised questions since the Buddha’s own time. One early philosophical school, called Pudgalavāda (Personalism), holds that although the Buddha rejects the existence of a substantial anātman and emphasizes the doctrine of the five impersonal aggregates (skandhas), there are instances in both the wording and the overall intent of his teachings that explicitly or logically imply the existence of something in the human being called pudgala, or person, which constitutes the “I” of the human being. This research employs a descriptive-analytical method to explain the claim of the Personalist school. First, it shows that from their perspective, there are both textual and theoretical reasons confirming the real and ultimate existence of the pudgala. It then explains how the Personalist school transforms Theravāda ontology by introducing the category of pudgala into their two-category system. Finally, regarding the nature of the pudgala, it can be argued that from the Personalist viewpoint, it is: 1) real, 2) ultimate, 3) indifferent to conditioned and unconditioned phenomena, and 4) ineffable.
چکیده و کلیدواژه فارسی (Persian)
Title :حقیقت شخص (پودگله) در مکتب بودایی پودگله‌واده
Abstract:
یکی از آموزه‌های بودا، آموزۀ فقدان نفس جوهری (anātman) است؛ اما این آموزه از زمان خود بودا پرسش‌هایی را به‌دنبال داشته است. یکی از مکاتب فلسفی متقدم با نام پودگله‌واده (شخص‌گرایان) قائل است که هرچند بودا وجود آتمن جوهری را رد می‌کند و بر آموزۀ پنج اسکندای نامتشخص تأکید دارد، اما هم در عبارات و هم در تقدیر آموزه‌های وی، مواردی به چشم می‌خورد که صراحتاً یا منطقاً متضمن این هستند که در انسان چیزی به‌نام پودگله یا شخص نیز وجود دارد که تقوم‌بخش «من» انسان است. ما در این تحقیق تلاش کرده‌ایم که با روش توصیفی ـ تحلیلی مدعای مکتب شخص‌گرایان را تبیین کنیم. ازاین‌رو در وهلۀ نخست نشان داده‌ایم که از نظر آنان، هم دلایل متنی و هم نظری در تأیید هستی واقعی و نهایی پودگله وجود دارد. سپس تبیین کرده‌ایم که مکتب شخص‌گرایی، هستی‌شناسی تراواده‌ای را با وارد ساختن مقولۀ پودگله در نظام دومقوله‌ای آنها دگرگون می‌کند. نهایتاً در خصوص چیستی پودگله می‌توان گفت که آن از نظر شخص‌گرایان، 1. واقعی، 2. نهایی، 3. علی‌السویه نسبت‌به امور مشروط و نامشروط و 4. بیان‌ناپذیر است.
Keywords:
References:
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Saberi Varzaneh, Hosein. (2026) The Reality of the Person (Pudgala) in the Buddhist School of Pudgalavāda. معرفت ادیان (Ma`rifat Adyan), 17(2), 155-174 https://doi.org/10.22034/marefateadyan.2025.5002264.
Hosein Saberi Varzaneh."The Reality of the Person (Pudgala) in the Buddhist School of Pudgalavāda". معرفت ادیان (Ma`rifat Adyan), 17, 2, 2026, 155-174
Saberi Varzaneh, H.(2026) 'The Reality of the Person (Pudgala) in the Buddhist School of Pudgalavāda', معرفت ادیان (Ma`rifat Adyan), 17(2), pp. 155-174
